When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the sharp global increase in grain and fertilizer prices disrupted the Egyptian economy, which was already worn down by the covid-19 pandemic, water shortages, and debt. Then came Russia’s withdrawal from the Turkish-mediated deal to allow Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea, which pushed prices up once again. By the time Hamas launched its barbaric attacks against Israel on 7 October, Egypt’s annual inflation rate was nearing 40%. Since then, the Israeli reprisals and the unprecedented Palestinian casualties they have caused in Gaza mean that Egypt has been on the front line of a new security and humanitarian crisis. Finally, it bears mentioning that on 1 January 2024, this long-standing regional pillar of the Western-led security order will join the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

Such case studies should disabuse us of a persistent misunderstanding about the world today. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza cannot be neatly set aside from the broader “polycrisis” and reorientation of global power. The economic and climate-related disruptions that are falling hardest on non-Western countries such as Egypt cannot be disentangled from the declining influence of the post-World War II multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations. What matters most in the coming year is whether global issues can still be addressed simultaneously and in unison—as they must be if workable solutions are to be found.

The interlinked nature of today’s crises was evident at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly in September. There, Ukraine and its Western allies recognized that to gain a wider hearing from the “Global South,” they must do something about today’s economic and climate turmoil, global inequities, and the wider failings of the UN and the international system. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres himself acknowledged, “We cannot effectively address problems as they are if institutions do not reflect the world as it is. Instead of solving problems, they risk becoming part of the problem.”

These tonal shifts have prepared the way for various reforms. For example, proposals to augment the fiscal power and representative equity of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) appeared to gain momentum at the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Marrakesh in October. And to make the UN system more responsive to member states and capable of taking the initiative, a new rule allows for a full General Assembly debate whenever a permanent member of the security council wields a veto.

But reforms must be more ambitious than this to nudge a failing system on to a better path. Western countries should recognize that it is in their own interests to go further. As I write in late October, their backing of Israel’s reprisals in Gaza appears to be driving an even deeper wedge between the “West and the rest”, fuelling renewed accusations of double standards. The need for strong Western commitments to support global-governance reform is even more urgent now than it was at the beginning of 2023.

I see three possible scenarios for 2024. In the gloomiest—and arguably the likeliest—no significant progress will be made on reforming either the UN system or the MDBs, because deepening global conflicts will have made such outcomes impossible. The West would end the year even more alienated from the rest, and the international system would appear even more out of step with what people around the world want from it. Polling by the Open Society Foundations across a representative group of 30 countries shows that clear majorities believe low-income countries should have a greater share in global decision-making (61%), and that rich countries should give more money to the World Bank (68%).

Alternatively, 2024 might bring real progress on MDB reform—with greater capitalization, improved debt-resolution mechanisms, and quota reforms—but no improvements at the UN. This scenario is also contingent on wider events. Between the carnage in the Middle East and a permanent member of the security council waging a war of aggression against its neighbour, there is ample reason to doubt that a consensus on UN reform is reachable. But this scenario also would be an additional testament to the system’s loss of influence more broadly. Countries are increasingly turning to other fora, such as the G20, the Brics, or smaller coalitions assembled around specific topics or interests. Most of these are not meant to complement the UN, but to substitute for it.

That said, it is still possible that the coming year could bring some modest progress on both fronts. In a polarized world, there will not be a cathartic “San Francisco moment” akin to the summit that established the UN at the end of WW-II, nor can we anticipate breakthroughs in the intransigent debates over expanding the security council. But it’s easy to see how creative, marginal measures could lend momentum to the push for change.

That could mean harnessing underused parts of the UN Charter. Article 27(3), for example, calls for countries to abstain from security council votes on issues where they have a conflict of interest; and Article 101 empowers the secretary-general to shape the agenda at security council meetings. The recent selections of secretary-generals have too often prioritized the cautious candidate over the ambitious one. Countries remember the two great secretary-generals—Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi Annan—who exercised an influence that they often couldn’t control. This time, there is a slight possibility of change, owing to the view that it is time to choose a woman from Latin America or the Caribbean, a region that provides a rich pool of candidates. That, together with a possible consensus—even among enemies in the security council and in the general assembly—that the UN’s current dysfunction serves nobody well, could lead to ambition trumping caution.

Whatever happens, it would be a mistake to view these challenges in isolation from conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Gaza. Egypt’s experience since the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine ought to make that lesson clear. To unite different parts of the world behind peaceful and equitable solutions and respect for international law, all major powers must commit in earnest to reforming multilateralism—both through the MDBs and at the UN.

But since new conflicts will undermine any reform efforts, major powers must ensure that peace, human rights, and security prevail in Eastern Europe, the Levant, and elsewhere. A world of runaway wars—in which state and non-state actors conclude (with good reason) that they can impose their will through military force—is not conducive to progress on problems like unsustainable debt and climate change. At the end of another year in which the world seems to be spinning out of control, we must approach our defining challenges holistically. Our mantra must be “both/and”, not “either/or”.